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 Thank you.  I  am very happy to  be  
here and I f irst o f  al l  would l ike to  
thank Hiroshima University  for the  
invitation.  
 
 
 What I  would l ike  to  do  is  to  try  to  
put memory of  the  war in  comparative  
domestic  context in  order  to try  to  
investigate  some of  the common 
issues that are  faced with trying to  
deal  with memory,  because  forgetting 
is  also  part  o f  l iv ing. One of  our  
questions really to  start with is the  
different levels  o f  memory that can be  
thought of .   Memory at  the  individual  
level  that the  story  we have heard o f  
the way that the Hibakusha pass on 
their  own individual personal  
memories.   That process can then be  
thought of  as having a co l lective  level  
where  that memory of  individuals 
comes together  and create ,  say  
co llective  memory or  memory on the  
national  level .   So,  what I  would l ike  
to  do today is  to  look at memory in  
terms of  spatial  scale moving from 
the national  scale  or  the  g lobal  scale ,  
which we wil l  hear about in  a few 
minutes, and to move in  to look at  
memory within Japan. The basic  
point I  am trying to  make today is  
that memory is  contested.   In  other  
words, in societies where the  legacy 
of  war brings about di fferent pol it ical  
approaches to  that memory and how 
that memory can be  used as a 
polit ical resource  to  try  to  create  
different futures,  Japan is  a  very  
good il lustration of  the way that as a 
result  o f  those contestations of  
polit ical v ision, what kind of  future  a 
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country wants, what kind of  future  
might be possible ,  then memory 
becomes within that polit ical context 
a  resource  which act  as a use  to  help  
them to try  to  create  these  dif ferent 
kinds of  futures.  
 
 
 So, within that context I will try to 
say something about how subnational 
agents, that is, agents on the level of 
the prefecture or the city, villages, and 
towns.  So the level below the state 
may struggle to negotiate and embed 
and disseminate their own particular 
memory so that it not only becomes 
part of their local memory but in some 
way impacts on the national level. So, 
this is where you get the contestation 
when a domineering or hegemonic 
national memory crowds out other 
memories.  This is contest between the 
embedding on a national level of 
collective memory made up of 
individuals, subnational special 
memories which are vying for 
prominence within that collective 
memory.  How do you contest with that 
problem?  What I would like to do is to 
show how that has been happening in 
Okinawa. 
 As we know, because  Japan lost  the  
World  War,  the  naming of  the  war is  
contested.  So,  when I  was asked to  
talk about this  question,  what name 
shall  I  use  for  the  war?   In  Britain 
it ’s  quite easy.  We just say the  
Second World  War and we all  
understand what it  is  but in  the  case  
of  Japan,  because  Japan lost  the  war,  
there are even struggles over how to  
cal l  the war.   Is  i t  the  East Asia War,  
the Greater  East Asia War,  the  
Second World  War,  the Pacif ic  War,  
the Asia Pacif ic  War,  and whichever 
of  those  t it les you use  creates a 
different sense  o f  what the  war was.   
So ,  I  wanted to  use  Asia Pacif ic  War 
because it  brings together  the  Pacif ic  
and Asian side  because,  of  course ,  the  
atomic  bombing of  Hiroshima can be  
seen in the context o f  the Pacif ic ,  the  
war with the  United States whereas 
Okinawa brings it  c loser  to  the  Asian 
part  of  the  equation.  
 The atomic  bombing of  Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki  is  also  contested.   So  
even once  we agree  that it ’s  an Asia 
Pacif ic  War then the  dropping o f  the  
atomic  bombs becomes a question of  
whether  it  is part  of  that war or  
whether it is  actually  the  start o f  the  
co ld war or the use  of  the  atomic  
weapons to be  contextualized in the  
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sense  of  the ending of  the  Second 
World  War or  do  we take a sort  of  
more revisionist  approach and think 
of  i t  rather as a f irst  strike in  the  
co ld  war,  which emerges just  a  few 
years later.   So  that is  the f irst  thing.   
The second of  course is  because  Japan 
then signed an al l iance  with the  
United States that al liance  is  based 
upon the existence  and potential  use  
of  nuclear weapons.  So , you have on 
the  one hand government pol icy,  
which is  based upon the  commitment 
to  an al l iance  with the United States.   
That al l iance has as its  premise  
American nuclear  weapons which 
may potential ly  be  used,  and you 
have that government pol icy  against  
the  attempt to  embed memory of  
Hiroshima and Nagasaki as leading 
to  or helping to promote the abol it ion 
of  nuclear  weapons.  So , there is  a  
tension there.   And of  course  the  
third  tension is  the  tension I  am 
interested today.  
 
 
 The tension within the  al l iance  
arises from the fact  that it ’s  not  only  
nuclear  al l iance ,  but it  also  has the  
conventional  aspect  to  the  al l iance  
and that conventional  aspect  leads to  
the deployment of  foreign so ldiers on 
Japanese  so i l .   Most of  those  foreign 
so ldiers are  in  Okinawa.   So ,  you 
have the problem in Okinawa then of  
how you resolve that dif ference  
between wanting to uti l ize  the  
memory of  the  war and government 
policy ,  which leads  to  American 
troops being in Japan.   My argument 
is  real ly developing from that.   In  
essence  Hiroshima has a problem in 
embedding its  own memory as one 
which should in  some way contribute  
to  the reduction and potential  
el imination of  nuclear weapons.   The 
problem here  is  that nuclear  weapons 
are  essential to  Japan's  nuclear  
al liance.   Then on the other hand 
Okinawa has a problem in embedding 
its  memory because  in  the  case  of  
Okinawa that comes into tension with 
government pol icy ,  that is ,  the  
deployment of  American mil itary  
forces in  Okinawa.   How do you deal  
with those two tensions?  I  don’t  have 
t ime to  address both,  so I  just  want 
to  focus on the  Okinawa part  of  that 
equation.   
 Firstly ,  i t ’s  very  diff icult  to  
promote  the  memory o f  Hiroshima 
Nagasaki in  Okinawa because  the  
Okinawan memory is  of  conventional  
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war and so  the  focus is very much on 
how that conventional war is l inked 
into an unending protest  and a sense  
that the  war has never  ended for  
Okinawa.  When I was doing research 
in  Okinawa I  interviewed the  
landowners who under duress may be  
forced to lend their land to  the  
American forces.   Many of  them when 
they talked about their land,  v iewed 
it  as sti l l  be ing occupied because  the  
war is  unending for  them.  So ,  this  is  
where  I  get  this  expression,  ‘ the  
unending war’  because  from their  
point of  v iew the war hasn ’t ended 
because they haven’t  got  their  land 
back.   The US mil itary instal lations 
are seen by the  government essential  
for  the  al l iance  and that brings  
dissonance  between the  national  
level and the subnational  level  in  
terms of  memory in Okinawa.  
 
 
 We saw this in 2013 when Prime 
Minister  Abe started for  the  f irst  
t ime to  promote  the  idea that the  war 
should be  commemorated.  So ,  
sovereignty  restoration day was 
introduced by the  Abe administration 
in  2013.   The memory for  pol it ical  
leaders in  Tokyo is  the memory o f  the  
occupation ending in Apri l  1952.   
That would be  the  co l lective  memory 
but o f  course for  Okinawa it  is  
complete ly  dif ferent because  they 
were  sti l l  occupied by the  American 
forces.   In  other words,  once  you 
include Okinawa something as “easy” 
as determining when the  end of  the  
war becomes much more  problematic .   
In  response  to  the  Abe announcement,  
in  Okinawa the  governor, local  
polit ical  leaders,  c it izens,  protesters 
etcetera talk about the idea that 
Japan’s  sovereignty restoration day 
should not be  celebrated in Apri l ,  
because Okinawa was sti ll  occupied 
unti l  1972.  In Okinawa, unti l  
reversion to  Japan in  May 1972,  
driv ing on the  other  side  of  the  road,  
using US dollars and having the  ideal  
of  wanting to  become a part  of  Japan 
under the post-war constitution – 
that was al l  part  o f  creating that 
post-war identity .   That post-war 
identity  real ly  doesn’t  start  unti l  the  
1970s after  Okinawa reverted to  
Japan.   Memory differs between the  
national  and the  subnational .  
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 From the perspective of  Okinawa 
the memory at the  col lective  national  
level can appear as forgetting.   In  
other words, the  ce lebration o f  
sovereignty day on a date when 
Okinawa had not returned to  Japan 
seemed to  many people in  Okinawa to  
suggest that the  Abe administration 
had forgotten about them or  didn’t  
care  about them.  Opponents of  the  
government in  Okinawa are  able  to  
use  that as a pol it ical  resource  to  
challenge the  polic ies o f  the  national  
government.   The point I  want to  try  
to  get across here  is  the idea that 
that memory is  not  something that is  
“dead.”  I t is  a l iv ing resource , which 
can be  used by pol it ical  agents to try  
to  advance  their  own polit ical vision.  
 
 
 This brings many in  Okinawa to  
view themselves and as dual  v ict ims.  
Victims not only  of  the United States 
in  the  war,  but v ictims as a result  of  
government pol icy ,  which means that 
they have the  disproportionate  
amount o f  American troops located in  
the prefecture .  This sense o f  Dual  
Victimization is  the  embedding on 
the  one hand of  the  American side  o f  
the equation,  which I  will  go into in  
a moment,  which is  the battle  o f  
Okinawa and the conventional  side  of  
the  war.   Then on the  other hand the  
vict imization that Okinawans can 
fee l as a result  o f  a  government pol icy ,  
which means a disproportionate  
amount o f  American mil itary  bases,  
are located in the  prefecture .   In this  
way,  the memory of  the  battle of  
Okinawa becomes central  to  their  
memory in  the  same way that an 
earlier  talk showed how important 
the artefacts and other aspects o f  the  
dropping o f  the atomic  bomb of  
Hiroshima was similarly  important 
for  that memory.   Once you have the  
passing o f  o lder  Okinawans with 
personal  memory o f  the  war then you 
are  left  with the  choice  o f  how to  
institutionalize that memory.   
Museums play a central  ro le  in  
promoting particular kinds of  
memories and I  would just  like  to  g ive  
you one example  to show the 
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di fference  between pol it ical  ideology 
of  the  governors in  Okinawa and how 
this af fected a museum exhibit ion.   
 
 
 Ōta Masahide was the progressive  
governor of  Okinawa during the  
1990s and he moved forward one of his 
goals as a governor, which was to 
create an Okinawa peace memorial 
museum.  During his first term he was 
working hard to establish that 
museum and I was in Okinawa at the 
time and when the first museum was 
completed, I went to see the exhibition. 
 
 
 One o f  the  most str iking parts of  
the exhibit ion was a diorama,  which 
had a mother and child .   They are  in  
a cave  and you have the  mother and 
the child  and then you have a  
Japanese  Imperial soldier with his 
ri f le  pointing at the  mother and child .   
They were  in  a wartime situation and 
the  implication is  that American 
troops may hear the  child  crying and 
wil l  f ind them and so  the  soldier  was  
in  a threatening posture  towards the  
woman and child .   In other words,  
depicting not the  Americans as the  
threat to the Okinawans but actually  
Imperial  Japanese  soldiers as the  
threat.   So,  this  was part of  the  
memory that was being created 
through the  museum at the  time of  
Ota as the governor.  
 
 
 When he lost  the  e lection,  under  
the next governor the diorama was 
changed so  the  r if le  d id  not appear to  
be  threatening the mother and child.   
The museum now represented the  
co llective memory on the national  
level.   In  the process,  there  was a big  
debate  between the  committee ,  which 
had been appointed when Ōta was 
governor and the  new governor who 
did  not support  the  memory that was 
being created of  the Japanese  so ldier  
pointing the  gun at  the  c iv i l ians.   
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This happened a few years ago  but I  
went last  year  and now the gun points 
outwards towards the  potential  
American enemies outside  the  cave  
rather than putting the  Japanese  
so ldier  as a threat as was the  original  
idea in  representing Okinawans as 
the  dual  v ictim,  vict im of  the  
Americans because  of  the war but 
also  v ict im of  mainland Japan,  in  the  
sense  that Japanese  troops could also  
be  a threat.  The reconstructed 
diorama promotes a dif ferent kind 
memory, Okinawa in the co l lective  
memory of  only  America being the  
enemy not Japan.   Here , I  am not 
talking about r ight or  wrong,  whether 
I  agree or disagree.  I  am just 
explaining the politics behind a 
museum exhibition in Okinawa, where 
the struggle over the representation 
of  an imperial soldier in the diorama 
intimates that Ōta is a progressive 
governor, whereas new governor was 
not a progressive governor.  He was a 
conservative political leader who 
wanted to embed the memory much 
more strongly that Okinawa is a part  
of the collectivity called Japan.  It was 
in this way that a change from 
progressive to conservative governor 
changed the way in which the 
subnational memory was 
institutionalized in the prefecture. 
 
 
 The second example I want to talk 
about is the commemoration of  the 
battle of  Okinawa (Okinawa Memorial 
Day, Irei no Hi,  “the day to console the 
dead”) .   This for Okinawans is 
extremely important because from the 
prefectural  level  the  battle  helps to  
nurture  a separate  identity and 
separate  sense  of  memory.   In  
Okinawa an annual  anniversary and 
memorial  service  to  commemorate the 
war dead, the dead of  the Battle of 
Okinawa, which was held f irst during 
the American occupation.  The date of 
the end of the Battle,  23 June, was 
established as a public holiday. 
However, following the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan in May 1972,  the 
holiday had to be abandoned because 
that wasn’t accepted by the Japanese 
Government as a national holiday 
until  the change in the local 
government law in 1991 and that 
memorial day was then reinstituted as 
a distinct memory in Okinawa.  The 
contestation over holding a public 
holiday to commemorate Okinawa 
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Memorial Day illustrates how 
politicians are using the institutions 
of the prefecture and the state to 
struggle over these different levels of 
memory.  
 
 
 In  other  words,  here  we can see  the  
contest there between trying to  
embed a specif ic  memory on the  
prefectural  level  versus the  memory 
on the  national  level .   The Okinawa 
Memorial Day is  ce lebrated in  
Okinawa every year and it has been 
really fascinating to see what happens 
every time Prime Minister Abe attends 
the memorial day as a representative 
of the national government.  He does 
actually attend the memorial event, 
which is every June, and at that time 
we see, my third point, how this then 
gets linked to contemporary politics.   
The original purpose of the Okinawa 
Memorial Day is to memorialize the 
battle of Okinawa and the dead.  I have 
gone through all of the data since 
Prime Minister Abe has been in power. 
 
 
 It’s very interesting, as every year 
the commemorations will start out 
about the battle of Okinawa and then 
after Prime Minister Abe finishes his 
speech, immediately the Okinawan 
politician start to talk about the 
military bases.  In other words, this is 
the way prefectural politicians are 
able to use the past in order to try to 
talk about issues of the present, in this 
case the relocation of the Futenma 
airbase.  The memorial event provides 
an opportunity for local politicians to 
oppose the Abe government's policy to 
build a new base in another part of 
Okinawa in Henoko. 
 
 So ,  every  year the  local pol itic ians  
use  the  fact  that they are  able to  
address the  Prime Minister  on 
Okinawa Memorial  Day and they use  
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that opportunity to build up pressure  
on the  government to try  to  change 
the pol icy to re locate the Futenma 
airbase to Henoko.  
 
 
 Historical ly ,  Prime Minister  Kaifu 
was the  f irst  prime minister  to  attend 
the Okinawa Memorial Day in  1994.  
Prime Minister Abe has attended in  
2007 as well as between 2013 -  2017.  
 
 
 In  this  way,  the  v isit  to  Okinawa 
of  national  leaders is  a  pol it ical  
opportunity for local politicians: the 
politics of the present are regularly 
linked to the memory of the past and 
this is particularly important for 
trying to deal with the issue of the 
relocation of  the base within Okinawa. 
The strong sentiment within Okinawa 
is that the alliance should be regarded 
as a national collective good, 
something that all  Japanese benefit 
from, so any cost associated with that 
collective good should be shared more 
equally throughout Japan.  The Abe 
government's policy to build another 
base in Okinawa is a challenge to that 
sense of collective identity where 
Okinawa is included when it is 
convenient for the government and 
not included at other times.  In 
essence, maintaining of  this unequal 
distr ibution of  US military  bases is  
the central aim of  the government,  
and the  central  aim of  the  Okinawans 
is  to  try  to  prevent them doing so .   
Anyone who has been fo l lowing the  
standoff  between the national  and 
prefectural  government over  the  
re location of  the Futenma base and 
the construction o f  a  new, expanded 
base  in  Henoko knows that the  
decision to  build  the  new base  goes  
back to  1996 and the base  has sti l l  
not  been built  as a  result  of  the  
strong opposit ion at  the local  level .  
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 The reason for  the longstanding 
controversy is that US mil itary  
instal lations in  Okinawa are  v iewed 
very much by local  people  as a r isk to  
their  everyday security or  r isk to  
their  everyday peace because of  
environmental  pollution, mil itary  
accidents,  crimes committed by U.S.  
service  personnel  and other  ways in  
which the existence of  the bases are  
seen as a threat to  their  dai ly l ives.   
These  concrete manifestations of  the  
risks and threats from US bases 
serves to  l ink together the memory of  
the  battle  of  Okinawa and the  cost  
that Okinawans are paying now and 
consistently  or regularly try to then 
use  different means to  embed these  
US mil itary  incidents and accidents 
as the  memory at the local level in  
contrast  to the  co l lective  or national  
memory which is  pursued. The way in  
which the  concentration o f  US 
mil itary  instal lations in  Okinawa 
means there ’s  an unequal  
distr ibution o f  the  cost  o f  the  security  
treaty  which leads local  people to  
view themselves as a v ict im within 
the national co l lectivity which then 
l inks to  this  idea of  Okinawans being 
the  v ict im of  Imperial  Japanese  
troops as well  as Americans during 
the war. Similarly ,  the construction 
of  a  new mil itary base  in  Okinawa 
instead of  in  another prefecture of  
Japan makes local opponents of  the  
US mil itary  presence in  the  
prefecture interpret  their  history  in  
such a way that that unequal  
treatment is  st i ll  continuing.   
 
 
 In this way, Okinawa as a vict im 
becomes the  premise  of  the cr it ic ism 
of  the  US-Japan al l iance .   What ’s  
really  interesting about the  way this 
idea of  memory  re lated to  v ict im is  
how such a l inkage serves to  
highlight what I  see  as the  fragi l ity  
or  the  vulnerabil ity  o f  the  all iance  
when it  is  based on the  sense  of  
vict imization instead of  a  co l lectiv ity  
where the costs are shared more  
equally and everyone accepts,  both on  
the main islands as well  as in  
Okinawa,  that the  sharing o f  the  
burden of  US mil itary  deployments is  
the cost  of  this  kind of  security  treaty  
which the  government pursues.  
That’s  the  message I  want to  leave  
you with. Memory is  not something 
simply  representing the  past ,  or  a  
facet  o f  the  past,  or  is  embedded in  
history  books.   I t ’s  also  a pol it ical  
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resource , which wil l  be used by 
polit ical actors to  try  to  create  their  
future  rather than other  futures.  
 
 
 We see that most clearly in the way 
in the two governors promoted 
different kind of memories through the 
institution of the museum, different 
memories of the past,  as contested in 
the diorama of the imperial soldier.  In 
short, remembering and forgetting are 
political resources of importance not 
only for the past, but also for the 
present and future. 
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